July 2025 has proven to be a critical juncture in the Ukraine-Russia war. Russia has intensified its targeting of Ukrainian ammunition depots, supply chains, and critical military infrastructure hubs, multiplying Deep Precision Strikes (DPS). Worryingly, the effectiveness of these attacks has once again highlighted some fundamental weaknesses in Ukrainian (and Western) capabilities and a growing asymmetric divide, one which Western decision-makers must continue to address with utmost intent.
The war in Ukraine is forcing Western nations to confront the reality of a "real war"—one fought over the long haul between evenly matched adversaries. Victory no longer hinges on a handful of Wunderwaffen vastly superior to the enemy's, but on integrated arsenals of complementary systems, combined to outmanoeuvre the complexity of an opponent's defences. In the age of ultra-high technology, logistics and stockpiling have once again found themselves at the heart of warfare.
Since the winter of 2023, battlefield dynamics have led both sides to resort more and more to DPS, designed to bypass heavily defended frontlines and hit high-value targets deep in enemy territory, and to overcome multilayered and flexible air-defence systems. This led Western leaders to assess such domestic capabilities, with wide-ranging strategic implications. Europe, in particular, is evaluating how to build credible DPS systems while managing political, legal, and budgetary constraints. A European Commission white paper released in March 2025 specifically mentions the shortfalls of European DPS capabilities, as well as shortfalls in protecting against them in all dimensions of the battlefield.
What is certain is that re-stockpiling and development funding are necessary if the Russian threat is to be kept at bay. Indeed, governments and armed forces are seeking to equip themselves quickly. Many solutions do exist, such as cruise missiles, whether launched from naval, air, or land platforms, ballistic missiles, gliding bombs, long-range UAVs, but short-term availability and long-term industrial sustainability are key as well as the absence of restrictions on use, such as may arise from foreign acquisition...
Does Russia have an advantage?
In Ukraine, each side's arsenals span different types of missiles and drones of varying range, altitude, and sophistication. Russia, in particular, has a devastating mix that includes Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Oreshnik IRBM, Iskander ballistic systems, Kh-101 air-launched missiles, and Iranian-supplied Shahed-type drones, to name the most renowned. Their attacks using these weapons combine different flight profiles and speeds to overwhelm (Western-provided) air defences.
Concerning Ukraine and its Western allies, there is an increased targeting of command posts, recruitment centres, ammunition depots, arms factories, transport hubs, and energy infrastructure. In December 2024, for example, Moscow claimed to have hit a Ukrainian SBU intelligence command centre, the Luch missile-design bureau in Kyiv, and even a U.S.-supplied Patriot air-defence system using high-precision weapons in response to Ukrainian DPS attacks on the Rostov region. In June 2025, the Russians struck the Kremenchuk oil refinery, which supplies fuel to the Ukrainian army fighting in the Donbas, while the railway logistical hub Lozova was attacked with drones in early August, damaging the train station and a nearby rail depot. Beyond the destruction caused by individual strikes, the sustained nature of the campaign has a cumulative effect: it is wearing down Ukraine's defensive capacity and hampers its ability to rebuild combat power fast enough to alter the battlefield balance.
Kyiv's integrated air and missile defence network has had successes, with Ukrainian officials often claiming high interception rates (although in August 2024, the average success rate of downing Russian missiles stood at 43%, according to military commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported Ukrayinska Pravdaà). Indeed, as military analysts note, both sides tend to present selective figures, and even a small number of missiles or drones getting through can inflict serious damage. The multi-vector nature of Russia's attacks—combining different domains, speeds, and warhead types—continues to challenge Ukrainian defences. Missile defence will in any case never be impenetrable, which is why Ukraine also seeks to implement counterstrike solutions, to carry fire and steel into enemy territory: the aim is indeed to deter Russia from carrying out such strikes in the future, by threatening it with similar or even greater damage on its own soil. And in this regard, Ukraine has shown imagination.
Ukrainian Ingenuity with Limited Means
Ukraine has sought to challenge Russia's deep strikes with a mix of Western-supplied weapons and home-grown innovations. The UK's Storm Shadow and France's SCALP cruise missiles, identical in design, have been used to hit high-value targets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine has also adapted its indigenous Neptune anti-ship missile for land-attack roles, while drones have been employed for long-range raids deep inside Russia itself.
One of the most notable operations, dubbed Operation Spiderweb, used more than 100 small FPV drones to attack Russian airbases deep inside the country, reportedly damaging Tu-95 strategic bombers. In parallel, Ukraine has continued to attack strategic targets in occupied Crimea and the Russian Black Sea Fleet using a mix of Western-provided missiles and Unmanned Vehicles, either aerial or maritime. These are occasional successes, useful for propaganda and political communication, but insufficient to effectively weaken the aggressor.
The European ELSA Response
These realities have raised alarms among Western analysts: while Western armies do possess certain capabilities, notably cruise missiles that have proven their effectiveness in Ukraine, they exist in very insufficient numbers. Indeed, Europe's strategic shortfall is concerning many Western decision-makers. NATO's Major General John Rafferty has warned that 90% of the alliance's long-range strike capacity comes from the United States. European militaries possess proven systems, such as the Franco-British SCALP/Storm Shadow, but inventories are small. Replenishment is slow, as production lines for complex munitions cannot easily be ramped up.
To obtain more, some European governments are turning to the United States. The Netherlands, for example, has turned to the U.S. for long-range weapons, including Tomahawk cruise missiles and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ERs) from Lockheed Martin. Germany has said it may acquire the U.S. Typhon missile system as a stop-gap solution while Europe develops its own next generation of long-range cruise missiles.
The real issue, especially with the current U.S. administration, is the need to acquire autonomous DPS capabilities with munitions designed and manufactured "en masse" and "in-house," to ensure that their use cannot simply be shut down by a mere switch... whether technical or political.
European defence companies are expanding capacity. Some firms are tripling output, especially with support from EU initiatives such as the €500 million ASAP ammunition scheme. But bottlenecks persist in high-tech components and skilled labour. The gap between European needs and actual stockpiles remains wide. In response, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland launched the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) in 2024, later joined by the UK and Sweden. The goal is to co-develop indigenous strike systems with ranges beyond 500 km, reducing reliance on U.S. weapons.
Projects under discussion include the LCM, a land-based evolution of MBDA's combat-proven naval cruise missile (MdCN) with a range of over 1,000 km, which has been presented as a "possible short term solution" for the ELSA initiative by French Minister of the Armies, Sébastien Lecornu. The ground-launched category also includes a new version of Kongsberg's NSM and a German-British cruise missile programme aiming for up to 2,000 km. The latter, however, will take years to mature since not all technologies have reached maturity, especially if a hypersonic solution were to be adopted (and it is not expected to enter service before the late 2030s).
Until then, European governments are seeking stop-gap measures, mainly from the United States. They are now also required to finance $100 billion worth of US arms purchases for Ukraine. The stakes are clear: if U.S. policy shifts away from large-scale military aid, both Ukraine and Europe risk a dangerous capability vacuum and an increased dependence. There are, however, European solutions in the short, medium, and long term to meet these needs, if and only if European countries decide to join forces.
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